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Vulnerable people, vulnerable resources? Exploring the relationship between people’s
vulnerability and the sustainability of community-managed natural resources
Caroline Barratta* and Edward H. Allisonb
aSchool of Health and Human Sciences, University of Essex, Colchester, UK; bSchool of Marine and Environmental Affairs, University of
Washington, Seattle, WA, USA
(Received 14 October 2013; accepted 7 March 2014)
Participatory approaches to the management of common-pool resources (CPRs) are built on the premise that resource-users
are dependent on the productivity of the resource and therefore have the incentive to act as resource stewards if empowered to
do so. Yet many CPR users have only temporary interest in using the resources. Moreover, they are vulnerable to a range of
stressors and risks unrelated to resource access and sustainability concerns. Both of these may undermine such incentives.
Furthermore, discounting theory posits that high vulnerability shortens time horizons so that vulnerable CPR users might
be expected to heavily discount future beneﬁts from resource conservation. We present an ethnographic study carried out
in two communities on Lake Victoria, Uganda, where ﬁsherfolk face a range of elevated risks to health and security.
These immediate risks undermine participatory ﬁshery management but this does not necessarily indicate inherently short
time-horizons; for many, ﬁshing and ﬁsh-trading are not perceived as a life-long occupation but as a means to generate
capital for investment in other businesses. Thus, whether they are vulnerable or not, it cannot simply be assumed that
current CPR users will have a long-term interest in participating in resource management. Incentivizing participation in
CPR management for long-term sustainability may have to address both people’s wider vulnerabilities and aspirations.
Keywords: community-based resource management; ﬁsheries; Uganda; sustainability; incentives
Introduction
Participatory approaches to the management of common-
pool resources (CPRs) are built on the premise that
resource users have the incentives and capabilities to act
as resource stewards. Before state intervention, CPRs
were managed by resource users through systems of local
rules that responded to a variety of individual and societal
needs and aspirations but were not necessarily related to
concerns for resource sustainability (Berkes 1989;
Charles 1994). With the modernization, monetization and
globalization of some common property resources, ﬁsh-
eries and forests for example, through the second half of
the twentieth century, accompanying concerns for manage-
ment led to traditional rules governing resource access and
utilization being replaced by a series of science-based tech-
nical regulations and controls of the amount of harvesting
from CPRs. Such rules were typically imposed by sover-
eign states (Charles 1994; Ribot 1995; Allison 2001).
This process has often failed to prevent continued over-
extraction and has marginalized local resource users in
the process (Acheson 2006). In the subsequent devolution
of power, states and their development partners have
focused on (re)building institutional capacity to manage
resources at the local level (Leach, Mearns, and Scoones
1999; Pretty and Ward 2001; Berkes 2004) whilst the exist-
ence of incentives amongst resource users is usually taken
as a given.
The assumption that local communities are incentivized
to protect the sustainability of the resource they utilize is
based on the neoclassical economic assumption that indi-
viduals will make rational economic choices in order to
maximize the proﬁt of livelihood activity and that they
would recognize the long-term gain from utilizing the
resource sustainably, despite potential short-term costs.
But the concept of rationality may not reﬂect the reality
of people’s economic decision-making as it overlooks
what Davis and Ruddle (2012, 246) refer to as the ‘real
world’ – the cultural, historical and social complexities
which affect the decisions people make. Furthermore for
economic rationality to apply, communities must have a
sense of ownership of the resource, whether individual or
collective (Davis and Ruddle 2012). The importance of
empowerment and ownership as essential components
of participatory management of CPR reﬂects this. But if
communities become populated by economic migrants
seeking to earn income in the short term, their interest in
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sustainably managing the resource may be limited, because
they prioritize generating immediate income rather than the
long-term viability and well-being of the community
(Barratt 2012).
In Mansﬁeld’s discussion of ﬁsheries, an example of a
CPR, she posed the question ‘Why [should ﬁshers] invest
in the long term sustainability of the ﬁshery if what
happens tomorrow or next week or next year is highly
uncertain?’ (2007, 320). Although Mansﬁeld is discussing
how, from a neoliberal perspective, a lack of property rights
makes the over-exploitation of the resource a rational
choice, we believe this question has wider implications.
Based on our and others’ previous work on livelihoods
and ﬁsheries management in sub-Saharan Africa (Sarch
and Allison 2000; Béné 2003; Jul-Larsen et al. 2003;
Allison 2005), we hypothesize that there are two major
factors, in addition to the issue of property rights, that
could inﬂuence the perceived success and sustainability
of management of these and other CPRs. First, many
CPR users are vulnerable to a range of stressors and
risks, from HIV to climate change, many of which are unre-
lated to resource access rights and the state of resources, but
these may inﬂuence how individuals utilize the resource
(e.g. Béné 2003; Allison and Seeley 2004; Mills et al.
2011). Also, it cannot be assumed that all resource users
aspire to retain their current livelihood activities and there-
fore have an interest in the long-term sustainability of the
resources they use; many users have diverse livelihoods,
with both simultaneous and sequential access to other
sources of income and food (Allison and Ellis 2001;
Abbott et al. 2007; Dorward et al. 2009). These factors
may both inﬂuence commitment to long-term resource
stewardship. Yet an examination of how individuals
respond to the risks and livelihood opportunities they
face and how these affect their use of the resource has
been lacking to date. This paper addresses this knowledge
gap by exploring the relationships between people’s vulner-
abilities, livelihood strategies and aspirations, and their
incentives to participate in the management of one of the
most globally signiﬁcant CPR – ﬁsheries.
Vulnerability in ﬁshing communities
Fisherfolk often live in high physical and economic inse-
curity (Allison 2005; Béné 2009; Mills et al. 2011) and it
has been suggested that, in such conditions, the propensity
to forego current income for the prospect of future gains
may be diminished (Allison et al. 2012; Barratt 2012).
The risks that they face come from a wide variety of
sources. Fishing is a high-risk occupation; there are an esti-
mated 24,000 deaths worldwide each year in the ﬁshing
industry due to drowning and accidents arising from the
operation of ﬁshing gear. This is a similar risk to that
from other hazardous occupations such as forestry and
coal mining (ILO 2004).
Many ﬁsherfolk are exposed to a range of environ-
mental, economic and social hazards (Nunan 2007; Béné
2009), ranging from exceptionally high prevalence of
HIV (Kissling et al. 2005; Seeley et al. 2012) to being at
particular risk from storms, ﬂoods and climate change
(Allison et al. 2009). The high mobility of ﬁshing liveli-
hoods also contributes to the vulnerability of ﬁsherfolk
because although migration may positively impact
income generation, it undermines social networks as men
work in locations distant from their partners and children,
increasing the vulnerability of both the ﬁshermen and
women particularly in relation to contracting HIV (Nunan
2010). Given this risk context, the priority concern
amongst ﬁsheries scientists and managers of the risk of
ﬁsh stock collapse may not be shared by those actually
engaged in the ﬁshing industry (Mills et al. 2011). In
order for ﬁsherfolk to manage the ﬁshery in a sustainable
way they must perceive the risk of ﬁsh stock collapse as
a key threat in order to be incentivized to take action to
prevent it. We now discuss this in relation to co-
management.
Fisheries co-management and the problem of assumed
incentives
An estimated 520 million people (ﬁshery-sector workers
and their dependents) – nearly 8% of the world’s population
– are to some degree dependent on ﬁshing-based income
(FAO 2009, 26) and ﬁsh and other aquatic food products
provide a range of nutritional beneﬁts from protein to a
variety of micronutrients (Kawarazuka and Béné 2011).
Finding a way to sustain or increase these beneﬁts is thus
of considerable importance but state-led regulation has
failed to protect ﬁsh stocks, threatening the poverty-alle-
viating and food security potential of the sector. Nor has
it delivered equitable and sustainable beneﬁts to resource
users but has contributed instead to their marginalization
(Hara and Raakjær-Nielsen 2003; Jul-Larsen et al. 2003;
Berkes 2004). To address these deﬁciencies states and
their development partners have been moving from
central state-led strategies towards community-based pro-
grammes and state–community partnerships for regulating
access to and extraction of natural resources (Allison
2001; Nielsen et al. 2004; Pomeroy and Andrew 2011).
But this focus on state–community partnerships has been
criticized for shifting the burden of ﬁsheries management
from the state to resource users whilst retaining (often
malign) state interference, advancing a neoliberal economic
perspective on the objectives and instruments of ﬁsheries
governance and ignoring issues of inequality and class
(Davis and Ruddle 2012).
Co-management, the dominant form of contemporary
community-based management in the ﬁsheries sector,
refers to a system of management where responsibility is
shared between the government and user groups (Sen and


























Nielsen 1996, 406). Co-management has taken a wide
variety of forms and lacks a deﬁnite deﬁnition. On the
one hand this allows for responsiveness to the local
context into which it is embedded (Jentoft 2003) but this
makes it difﬁcult to assess its success (Welch-Devine
2012) and arguably allows states to design systems which
best serve their own ends (Davis and Ruddle 2012). Most
commonly, regulations are set by the government with a
degree of resource-user consultation whilst responsibility
for enforcing them is devolved to a locally elected commit-
tee. However, the extent to which this represents empower-
ment of the ﬁshing communities and not simply an
extension of state power has been questioned (Béné
2009; Davis and Ruddle 2012)
Underlying the rationale for co-management are the
assumptions that local ﬁshing activities are depleting the
resource and local communities which utilize the resource
have sufﬁcient incentives to manage the resource sustain-
ably, despite potential short-term costs in the form of
income and other beneﬁts foregone. In his discussion of
incentives in the management of local commons,
Seabright (1993), drawing on the work of Hardin’s
(1968) description of the ‘tragedy of the commons’, out-
lines how if extraction by individual users will impose
negative externalities on other users by threatening the
sustainability of the resource, sufﬁcient incentives are
necessary to dissuade individual resource users from
excessive consumption. These may come from informal
sources, for example a negative response from the social
network in which individuals live and work, to formalized
incentives (or disincentives) which are established in law
or customary practice. A recent comparison of the success
of co-management in different locations found that estab-
lishing clear incentives, such as catch shares and conser-
vation beneﬁts in protected areas, was an important
predictor of co-management success (Gutierrez et al.
2011).
Implicit in this understanding is the assumption that
communities which utilize CPRs are dependent on them
and will continue to be so in the future and consequently,
as rational economic actors, they are automatically incenti-
vized to manage the resource sustainably. Yet in many set-
tings where communities utilize CPRs, livelihoods are very
ﬂuid to help deal with changes in circumstance (Allison and
Ellis 2001). Calls for a rights-based approach to ﬁsheries
management also rely on the incentives generated by econ-
omic rationality – that given secure access to the resource
ﬁshers will have sufﬁcient incentives to want to manage
the resource in a sustainable way. However, it has been
recognized that although insecure property rights increase
the vulnerability of ﬁshers, greater attention needs to be
paid to the wider context of risk and vulnerability in
which ﬁsherfolk live and work if we are to more fully
understand ﬁshers’ decision-making (Allison et al. 2012;
Cinner et al. 2012). Furthermore, co-management
programmes are often established in socio-political settings
in which corruption is common and as such the incentives
that can be established through custom or law may be dis-
torted when interacting with the state (Kolstad and Søreide
2009).
By considering how ﬁsherfolk perceive and experience
risk and how this inﬂuences their relationship with the
resource, this paper critically engages with the concept of
incentives which underpins co-management. Learning
why people act as they do is fundamental to any attempt
to inﬂuence behavior and, through policy, to shape it in
ways that are seen as socially and economically desirable
– and is therefore central to attempts to encourage sustain-
able natural resource use.
Using discounting to link vulnerability and sustainability
In order to explore whether CPR users, in this case ﬁsher-
folk, perceive resource decline or collapse as a priority
concern, and are therefore willing to act to restrain their
own and others’ activities to ensure future resource pro-
ductivity, we draw on the economic theory of discounting
where the value of future rewards is considered of less
worth than rewards gained today. We believe that although
we use discounting in a qualitative sense (we do not seek to
quantify the discount rates of ﬁshers) it is a useful concept
that increases our understanding of how vulnerability is
linked to the incentives which motivate behavior and in
turn affect willingness to comply with or support
institutions that aim to enhance resource sustainability. In
the ﬁsheries’ context we have described above, we hypoth-
esize that the high degree of risk exposure and vulnerability
of ﬁsherfolk lead to high discount rates, and limited incen-
tives to participate in managing a ﬁshery, despite being
dependent on it. This is an example of the principle, articu-
lated by nineteenth-century economic philosopher John
Stuart Mill, that individuals who perceive themselves to
be at risk, or to be insecure, discount the future more
strongly:
Where property is less safe, or the vicissitudes ruinous to
fortunes are more frequent and severe, fewer persons will
save at all, and of those who do, many will require the indu-
cement of a higher rate of proﬁt on capital, to make them
prefer a doubtful future to the temptation of present enjoy-
ment. (Mill 1848, XI 4)
This closely describes the context of many ﬁsherfolk whose
rights of access to the ﬁshery are not well deﬁned and who,
as a result of some of the additional risks mentioned in the
previous sections, do indeed appear to have a ‘doubtful
future’.
This research assesses whether the vulnerability of ﬁsh-
erfolk and their uncertainty regarding whether they will be
able to harness the promised future rewards of environmen-
tally responsible ﬁshing practice may result in increased


























levels of discounting. If, as is suggested by theory, high
levels of discounting with respect to ﬁshing behavior may
be a rational response to high levels of personal insecurity
then this would have important implications for the design
of co-management institutions. It would mean that ﬁshers
value the proﬁt they can make today much more than the
proﬁt that they could make in a highly uncertain future,
even if their rights to access the ﬁshery were to be secure
and exclusive.
We now move on to outline the study in more detail,
describing the two case study communities and the
methods used for data collection.
Research context
The research was carried out at two landing sites on Lake
Victoria, Uganda, between April 2007 and July 2008.
The Ugandan ﬁsheries sector underwent signiﬁcant expan-
sion throughout the 1990s. Fish exports from Uganda
peaked at almost 37,000 tons in 2005 but declined to
approximately 24,000 tons in 2010 (DFRU 2012). But
the number of ﬁshers on the Ugandan part of Lake Victoria
rose from 34,889 to 54,148 between 2000 and 2006
(DFRU 2006, 14). The overall ﬁsh stock in the lake
remained quite stable between 1999–2001 and 2005–
2006, reducing from 2.17 mt to 2.15 mt, the stock of Nile
perch declined more signiﬁcantly from 1.29 mt to 0.82
mt (LVFO 2009). The appropriateness of these stock
assessments as well as the role that ﬁshing effort has
played in the decline have been called into question.
Kolding et al. (2008) have highlighted that other factors
which play a role in determining ﬁsh populations, such
as the ﬂuctuating carrying capacity of the lake due to
natural climatic variability, have not been accounted for
and as such the impact of ‘overﬁshing’ has been over-
emphasized. But even if this is the case given the rapid
increase in the numbers of ﬁshers on Lake Victoria, and
the known vulnerability of larger ﬁsh such as Nile perch
to depletion due to harvesting pressure (Jennings, Rey-
nolds, and Mills 1998), there is still an important role for
ﬁsheries management to play.
The creation of the co-management institutions on Lake
Victoria was carried out in response to the concerns of state
and international ﬁsheries management agencies that some
of the important ﬁsh stocks of Lake Victoria were being
harvested at levels that threatened their ecological and
economic viability. These co-management arrangements
formed part of the Implementation of a Fisheries Manage-
ment Plan project which ran between 1 April 2003 and 31
August 2008. The Beach Management Units (BMUs) that
form the key institutions in the co-management strategy
on Lake Victoria were formed earlier, under the Lake Vic-
toria Environmental Management Programme which ran
from 1997 to 2004. The leadership committees of these
units are elected by BMU members and have legal
powers to enforce ﬁsheries regulations and can recommend
the creation of local by-laws to local government. The Lake
Victoria ﬁshery in Uganda is therefore a useful illustrative
case of natural resource management in the context of con-
strained management resources and perceptions of increas-
ing pressure on the resource.
Methods
The ﬁeldwork was carried out over two six-month periods
(April–October 2007 and January–June 2008) with the
ﬁrst author spending four months living in each commu-
nity, during which time data collection was carried out.
Structured interviews were carried out to assess house-
holds’ experiences of particular risks. Purposive sampling
was used to ensure that a range of occupational groups was
included, for example shop keepers, bar owners, ﬁsh pro-
cessors, ﬁshers and boat owners. In Kitanba 59 respon-
dents completed the interviews, whilst in Mhinga 67
participants were interviewed. Focus group discussions
were conducted with Local Council1 (LC) members,
BMU committee members, ﬁshermen and a group of
women in each community. Finally, 21 respondents in
Kitanba and 20 in Mhinga participated in in-depth inter-
views during which life histories were collected and
narrative analysis was used to gain a sense of how ﬁsher-
folk experienced and responded to risk throughout their
lives. The analysis here draws from all these data
sources as well as informal conversations and ﬁeld notes
made by the ﬁrst author whilst living in the two
communities.
Case study descriptions
The two selected landing sites, Kitanba2 and Mhinga, are
located in Kalangala and Mukono Districts.
Kitanba
Kitanba is situated on one of the Ssese Islands in Lake Vic-
toria. The population of Kitanba was dominated by
members of the Buganda tribe (approximately 75% of the
total population) but included a wide range of ethnic
groups from Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania.
Kitanba had approximately 700 residents. Over 90%
of boats in Kitanba had engines compared with just
under 21% of all boats in Uganda (DFRU 2006). The
main ﬁshing activity was for Nile perch and tilapia
using gill nets. The main ﬁsh table (the local marketing
and handling facility) met the EU minimum standards
for hygiene and sanitation. However, beside this organized
commercial enterprise was a smaller subsistence ﬁshery
dominated by small boat owners, many with dugout
canoes. Opportunities to pursue livelihood choices away
from ﬁshing were limited because the landing site was


























surrounded by commercial oil palm plantations and as a
result land available for cultivation was severely limited.
The BMU in Kitanba was created in 2003. The
largest boat owner, a woman, was the BMU treasurer,
who was considered the community leader and was very
well respected. Her strength of leadership had led the
BMU to appear reasonably successful and illegal ﬁshing
was recognized to have declined since the BMU was
created.
Mhinga
Mhinga lies in the Mukono District on the shore of Lake
Victoria. The LC area of Mhinga was home to approxi-
mately 500 people, 250 of whom actually resided at the
landing site. In Mhinga the ethnic mix was greater than
in Kitanba but the Buganda group was still the most domi-
nant, especially in farming areas more distant from the
landing site.
Boat owners tended to own one or two boats, without
engines, and some boat owners ﬁshed for themselves
which was rare in Kitanba. Demand for boat crew was
therefore limited, leading to a paucity of paid ﬁshing
work for those that did not own boats. Fishing patterns
also differed; Nile perch and tilapia ﬁshing is conducted
largely in the daytime, often early in the morning, and
mukene3 ﬁshing at night. The majority of people in
Mhinga had diversiﬁed livelihoods earning money from a
combination of farming, ﬁshing and rearing animals. This
reﬂects the trend of households engaged in small-
scale ﬁshing, especially in developing countries, to
pursue several other income-generating activities simul-
taneously or sequentially, to supplement or complement
ﬁshing income (Allison and Ellis 2001; McGoodwin
2001).
The BMU leadership in Mhinga was not accorded the
same respect as that in Kitanba. In discussions with key
informants the BMU chairman was described as corrupt
and easily bribed – for example he would return illegal
nets to ﬁshers in return for a payment from the ﬁsher.
The BMU had not made much progress in terms of limiting
illegal ﬁshing activity and illegal ﬁshing methods such as
‘tycooning’4 could be witnessed near the shore in daylight
hours.
Experiences of risk and vulnerability
The risks identiﬁed by research participants related to four
themes: economic vulnerability, the direct physical risks of
ﬁshing, ill health and theft. Small-scale ﬁshing has long
been associated with income poverty, (Bailey 1988, 36).
However, an increasing number of studies are showing
that those who specialize in ﬁshing can have substantially
higher incomes than households engaged in other occu-
pations in the same rural areas (e.g. Allison 2005; Béné
2009). In Mhinga and Kitanba it was tempting to assume
that the communities were income-poor due to the poor
housing and lack of sanitation. But in a focus group discus-
sion with ﬁshers in Kitanba it was established that some
ﬁshers (working as ﬁshing crew members) had earned up
to 300,000/- ($178)5 a month, although the discussion indi-
cated incomes ranging from 100,000/- ($59) to 200,000/-
($118) a month were typical. In Mhinga the low ﬁsh
catches and the movement of the large boat owners away
from the landing site meant that job insecurity was high
and earnings low. Fishers who worked as hired crew
reported only being able to make 1000/- to 2000/-
($0.59–$1.18) a day, which equates to 30,000–60,000/-
($18–$36) per month if the work is regular. Incomes
from ﬁshing therefore varied signiﬁcantly, but did have
the potential to result in wages well above the poverty
line of 63,000/- a month (using a measure of $1.25 a
day) and above the median monthly income for men
working rural areas which was 77,000/- ($46) in 2008
(Kasirye 2011).
The experience of economic vulnerability was different
for different occupational groups within the ﬁshery sector,
and differed between genders. The income of ﬁshers was
dependent on the amount of ﬁsh caught as crew were
paid a percentage of the catch value. Therefore, a decline
in ﬁsh catch resulted in reduced incomes and even job
losses if boat owners decided to keep their boats ashore.
Boat owners, although amongst the richest people in the
community, occasionally reported large debts due to the
start-up capital that entering the ﬁshing industry requires.
In Kitanba the BMU treasurer often lent money to other
boat owners when ﬁsh catch was low and they could not
cover the cost of fuel.
Reduced ﬁsh catch was therefore an important source
of economic vulnerability for boat owners and ﬁshers and
the problem was discussed at both landing sites. It was gen-
erally attributed by ﬁshers to illegal ﬁshing or to the
increase in the number of ﬁshers on the lake. The BMU
chairman in Kitanba remarked ‘Previously the ﬁsh were
seasonal; they could be many in some months and
reduced some months, but this time [the period of low
catch] has been prolonged.’
However, low ﬁsh catch did not just affect those
directly involved in ﬁshing. A 39-year-old female health
worker in Mhinga emphasized the importance of the ﬁsh
catch to all businesses at the landing site ‘It [low ﬁsh
catch] is a problem because all the incomes of the people
here depend on ﬁsh. So it is a problem that affects everyone
because no business can proﬁt when the ﬁsh catch is low.’
For women economic vulnerability resulted from the lack
of available work (for them and/or their partner) or separ-
ation from their partner. Having a boyfriend or husband
was regarded as a valid way of alleviating economic
problems. Overt sex work was also common. Furthermore,
lack of livelihood diversiﬁcation options, especially at


























Kitanba, and declining returns from agricultural produce
added to the economic vulnerability of community
members.
Additionally, ﬁshing is widely recognized as a far more
dangerous industry than most land-based occupations
(Béné, Macfadyen, and Allison 2007). A study of accidents
in small-scale ﬁsheries such as those operating from
Kitanba and Mhinga notes that loss of life and accident
rates are higher amongst artisanal and other small-scale
ﬁsheries than in their industrialized counterparts (Ben-
Yami 2000). This risk frames the broader risk context of
any ﬁshing community and differentiates them from other
rural communities. In a focus group discussion in
Kitanba, where the ﬁshing was often more dangerous
because it was done at night and distant from the shore,
the ﬁshers spoke about being on the water as being in the
‘death zone’. In Mhinga a ﬁsherman described his fear of
being on the lake during the ﬁshermen’s focus group
discussion:
For me, I do not see any good thing in the lake because I
have to use my strength to reach where I want to go and
there is no security that I can be safe in that boat. About
two days ago our friend died; he was also in a boat and it
just fell in water and he sank in water. So water is very
risky.
The economic consequences for the dependent household/s
of a fatal accident to a ﬁsher on the water can be devastat-
ing, as a major contributor to the household income is lost.
Accidents also often result in the loss of boats and
equipment.
However, it is not just the risks that ﬁshers are exposed
to on the water that pose a threat to ﬁshing communities. Ill
health in poor households can result in serious adverse
economic consequences for both individuals and house-
holds and can bring increasing poverty to those affected
(Corbett 1989). Work in the capture ﬁshery is physically
demanding and as a result an illness does not have to be
serious before output is affected. The close proximity of
ﬁshing communities to water increases exposure to dis-
eases such as malaria and schistosomiasis, whilst the poor
medical facilities available locally make it difﬁcult and
expensive to access effective medical treatment. In
Kitanba and Mhinga ill health was clearly perceived by
respondents as a risk. It was the most common response
when people were asked what they feared and what risks
they had experienced in the last year. The high incidence
of both HIV (Seeley et al. 2012) and schistosomiasis
(Parker et al. 2012) in Lake Victoria ﬁshing communities
supports these ﬁndings. In Kitanba and Mhinga, although
HIV and AIDS were not spoken about openly there
was an awareness, which came out during individual
interviews and focus group discussions, that prevalence
in the communities was high. This was largely blamed
on the presence of sex workers in the communities but
was also contributed to by the general high level of
promiscuity.
Responses to risk and opportunity
Drinking has been related to the high-risk nature of ﬁshing
as an occupation which leads to ‘high levels of stress, social
pressure to drink, boredom and separation from social
relationships’ (Matheson et al. 2001, 308). In Mhinga and
Kitanba both drinking and drug taking were widespread
and were frequently associated with reducing people’s
awareness of risk. Alcohol was easily and cheaply available
at both landing sites and was drunk openly by many com-
munity members, both men and, to a lesser extent, women.
In Mhinga however, alcohol consumption was more widely
accepted, included a wide age range of participants and
community leaders could often be seen drinking in local
bars. In Kitanba the consumption of alcohol was limited
to certain groups, especially young ﬁshers and sex
workers. Community leaders in Kitanba tended to avoid
drinking alcohol. The BMU secretary reported drinking
beer when he was in the capital city but would not do
this at the landing site for fear of being associated with
those that do.
Community members offered several key reasons for
why many people within the community drank alcohol or
took drugs: to forget their problems; suppress fear and dis-
comfort; and because they have too much spare time and
ready cash. In Kitanba direct references were made connect-
ing the risks on the water and the use of drugs and alcohol.
Fishermen compared themselves to soldiers, drinking to
cover up fear. A further cause of discomfort was leaving
their families and communities behind, which makes them
‘think so much’, and because they are lonely they drink.
Strategies for dealing with risks associated with the
ﬁshing industry frequently involved diversiﬁed livelihood
approaches which reduced dependency on ﬁshing
(Allison and Ellis 2001; McGoodwin 2001). For example
the extract below was recalled by a 33-year-old ﬁsher in
Mhinga. His life story was dominated by the impact of
theft on his livelihood and how he had dealt with it:
… the thieves stole my engine from the shade of my house
… I started life again; I went and started cultivating; I grew
maize and I bought other boats and started trading again
…. In 2003 I bought other nets and a boat; there were
40 nets and they were also stolen from the lake. What I
know is that whenever my things are stolen that I get the
money from farming, so I went back into farming and
rearing chickens. I bought other nets and they were also
stolen about 20 times… there is no security on the water.
Although he gave no speciﬁc reason for returning to ﬁshing
again and again the interviewee suggested that he had few
other options and that he thought ﬁshing would eventually
prove the most proﬁtable option despite the apparent
challenges.


























Fishers also reported making changes to their ﬁshing
practices in light of their vulnerability and risk events
they have experienced. For example in Kitanba when ﬁsh
catches fell boat owners sometimes chose to keep boats
on the shore for several days so that they did not waste
money on fuel. The vulnerability of poorer ﬁsherfolk to
low ﬁsh catch and reduced income was given as a key
reason for why ﬁshers in Kitanba and Mhinga use unsus-
tainable ﬁshing methods. In discussion, Mhinga ﬁshermen
gave three reasons, all of which related to particular sources
of vulnerability: ﬁrst, people are poor and cannot afford to
buy the required materials; one legal net cost more than ﬁve
or six illegal nets. Second, the ﬁsh traders are encouraging
illegal ﬁshing by buying small ﬁsh, as larger ﬁsh were
becoming fewer and were not sold at the landing site due
to more proﬁtable markets elsewhere, and third declining
ﬁsh stocks and the small average size of the remaining
ﬁsh makes catching ﬁsh with a legal net difﬁcult due to
its mesh size being larger than that of the illegal nets. In
Mhinga they also raised the problem of people bringing
illegal ﬁshing methods into the community from outside.
One ﬁsherman said: ‘The ﬁshing techniques which were
used before changed…We used to lay nets and catch
many ﬁsh but these days people beat the water [use
tycoons]… and scare the ﬁsh away.’ Therefore, as the vul-
nerability of ﬁshers grows the motivations for using illegal
ﬁshing methods increase, providing a clear linkage
between vulnerability and sustainability.
Opportunities and commitment
As well as being informed by vulnerability, the decisions
and attitudes of individuals in ﬁshing communities were
also inﬂuenced by the economic opportunities and
success they achieve. In Kitanba and Mhinga people
came to the landing sites because they believed that their
lives would be improved through doing so because of the
economic opportunities available there. In both commu-
nities there has been a signiﬁcant transition from non-
ﬁshing to ﬁshing livelihoods in the span of one generation.
Of the 59 respondents to the structured questionnaire in
Kitanba 39% were now working as ﬁshers but only 2%
had parents that did so. Similarly in Mhinga of the 67
respondents 38% were now working as ﬁshers but only
8% had parents that did so. The signiﬁcance of this in
relation to commitment or motivation to participate in
resource management is discussed later.
Fishing in Kitanba and Mhinga was commonly seen as
a way of making money which can then be invested in other
economic enterprises or to meet other social needs. The
higher incomes in Kitanba meant that ﬁshers there had
been far more successful in realizing this opportunity
than in Mhinga. In Kitanba one ﬁsherman said:
Fishermen keep on changing: anyone who gets enough
money goes and does other businesses. You cannot say
that ﬁshermen will always be ﬁshermen. Today I am a ﬁsh-
erman; tomorrow I will be a businessman. I can get enough
money and go.
However, in the life history interviews it became apparent
that some ﬁshers felt frustrated by their inability to save
and make investments. It was repeatedly reported by
leaders in both communities that ﬁshers get ‘caught up’
in life at the landing site and that despite their initial
desires to save money and improve their family’s life
they get involved in the landing site lifestyle and therefore
are unable to make the progress initially sought. This sup-
ports the idea that ﬁshing was perceived as a temporary
occupational alliance, not a long-term commitment,
although in practice this is not always realized.
The anthropological literature on ﬁshing engages
extensively with the commitment of ﬁsherfolk to ﬁshing
and their tendency to stay in the industry despite declining
returns (see Acheson 1981; Peace 1991). This is thought
to be due to the satisfaction that ﬁshers get from ﬁshing,
at the root of which is a strong sense of identity, of
being ‘a ﬁsherman’. The idea of involving local commu-
nities in ﬁsheries management is based on the premise
that ﬁshers are committed to ﬁshing in the future, both
economically and culturally, but does not fully recognize
that many ﬁshing communities have been managing the
ﬁshery through their own institutions. However, in
Mhinga and Kitanba many of those living at the landing
site, both ﬁshers and boat owners, were recent entrants
in the industry and hoped that ﬁshing would provide
them with income. Joining the ﬁshery was a decision
often made through lack of comparable alternatives for
making money. This has implications for how individuals
and the communities perceived and utilized the resource
as well as how the community functioned. Co-manage-
ment is based upon an idealized notion of community
that assumes that community members reside in the
same place and share similar perspectives that enable
them to work together towards shared objectives but this
simplistic ideal has been called into question (Agrawal
and Gibson 1999; Allison and Ellis 2001; Pratt 2012).
Pratt notes that communities are better understood as
‘messy and fractured, always turning up unforeseen com-
plications and disrupting ideals’ (2012, 179). In Mhinga
and Kitanba the wide range of ethnic groups present,
the frequency with which ﬁsherfolk moved between
landing sites and the high number of new entrants into
the ﬁsheries, whose families had no history of ﬁshing,
were all factors which undermined the community ideal
on which co-management relies.
Discounting in ﬁshing communities
The propensity of ﬁsherfolk in Mhinga and Kitanba, ﬁshers
in particular, to engage in several key risk behaviors
suggests that discount rates amongst ﬁsherfolk may be


























high. As already mentioned, in Mhinga and Kitanba ﬁsher-
folk had a propensity to engage in alcohol consumption and
drug taking both of which have been linked with high dis-
count rates. Bishai (2001) found that alcohol consumption
and frequency of alcohol consumption correlated with time
preference: those with a greater rate of time preference
(higher discount rate) were more likely to drink, and to
drink more frequently than those with a lower rate of
time preference. Similarly, amongst injectors of heroin
and amphetamines active users were found to have signiﬁ-
cantly higher discount rates than non-users and even ex-
users (Bretteville-Jensen 1999).
Therefore, in Kitanba and Mhinga we would expect
that the mean discount rate would be greater than in a com-
munity in which these activities are less common, because
the individuals involved in these behaviors, most fre-
quently the boat crew rather than boat owners, are likely
to have higher discount rates than those who abstain from
such activities. However, not all ﬁsherfolk engage in such
behaviors and the literature on addiction raises interesting
questions about whether ﬁshers have inherently high dis-
count rates or whether these have changed following their
arrival at the landing site. Additionally, exposure to risk
may not in itself result in discounting, but the behaviors
in which people engage in order to cope with these risks
such as drinking alcohol and consuming drugs may cause
them to discount the future more greatly.
The lack of savings culture and high expenditure on
activities which bring short-term gratiﬁcation also suggest
that discount rates amongst ﬁsherfolk are high. In an infor-
mal conversation with a young ﬁsher in Kitanba about
whether ﬁshers like ﬁshing, he responded:
Yes they do, they enjoy the money. In the village it is
necessary to be more careful because of the seasonality
of the crops and the amount of time between planting
and getting money… there are some ﬁshers that have
responsibilities elsewhere and take the money and go
straight home but the majority just spend, especially the
younger ones.
For this young ﬁsher, the distinction between ﬁshing and
farming was in the regularity of the cash income which
they generate. Fishing results in a regular cash ﬂow
which reduces the necessity of saving or thinking
about the future: they can just say ‘I will get [money]
tomorrow.’ Conversely, agriculture-based enterprise
requires a much greater consideration of the future
because the time between periods of cash income is much
greater. Another ﬁsher from Mhinga made the following
remark
… a person in the village is far better – they can set goals
and achieve them but here we live on probability. That is
why you see so many children on the landing site are not
educated and we are here just suffering.
The idea of ‘living on probability’ refers to the wide
variety of risks that they face and how nothing is certain,
making it difﬁcult to invest and make decisions about the
future.
The data from Mhinga and Kitanba presented so far
seem to suggest that the conventional narrative, articulated
by ﬁshery managers and scientists (and sometimes by
ﬁshers themselves), that ﬁsherfolk ‘live for today’ may
apply to the ﬁshermen in these communities and that
their daily cash income and the inherent uncertainties in
how good the catch will be on a particular day discourage
long-term planning (Acheson 1981).
In Kitanba and Mhinga, as already mentioned with
regard to savings and investment, there were those individ-
uals who invested wisely and planned for the future. This
was predominantly individuals who owned boats, had a
successful business and/or had a leadership position.
People’s plans for their children also indicated how they
thought about the future. The high level of motivation
amongst parents in Kitanba and Mhinga to educate their
children actually implies a long-time horizon in terms of
both their children’s well-being in the future and their
own. Women reported going without food in order to
raise sufﬁcient money to pay school fees which is a clear
example of deferred gratiﬁcation, illustrative of low dis-
count rates.
This alternative construction of ﬁsherfolk as long-term
planners and savers is also supported in the literature.
Poggie (1978) found that the most successful ﬁshers were
those most willing to choose long-term investments rather
than expending income on goods or services which
offered immediate rewards. Firth (1966, 82) notes that the
idea that the Malay ﬁshermen he was studying were essen-
tially disorganized and took things as they came was
wrong:
It is true that the scale of their organization is not very large
and that there are men here, as everywhere, who are content
to work in a rut. But within the scope of their organization
their planning is often careful, even anxious, and may be
looking months ahead.
Clearly, there was a mix of discount rates in the com-
munities and it is very difﬁcult to identify speciﬁc contri-
buting factors. The business success and acumen
displayed by some of the boat owners indicate that they
have long time horizons with regard to their business and
economic well-being. Our research supports Poggie’s
(1978) contention that success in the ﬁshing industry
demands such a perspective. However, you can survive in
the ﬁshing industry without being a boat owner and
without saving, and this seems to be associated with short
time horizons and high discount rates, at least with regard
to expenditure. And although many ﬁshers have good
intentions of saving and taking money home when they


























ﬁrst arrive, few actually do this for a sustained period of
time as they get caught up in the lifestyle of the industry
with its focus on short-term gratiﬁcation. However,
whether or not a ﬁsher creates a successful enterprise will
not just be dependent upon his or her own capacity and
choices but also on issues such as power and class relations
within the community. It is contended that class has been
overlooked in discussions about co-management, despite
the potential relationship between vulnerability and class
(Jentoft 2007; Davis and Ruddle 2012), and although we
focus on individuals in this paper we recognize that under-
standing the choices that ﬁsherfolk make would be
enriched from research which explored these issues more
explicitly.
Relating discounting and sustainability
We have tried to establish that whilst some ﬁsherfolk
exhibit behavior indicative of short time horizons and
that the occupation of ﬁshing facilitates this, many do
not. We now consider how the discount rates amongst ﬁsh-
erfolk may impact on the priority they give to investing in
the sustainability of the resource, through compliance and
support for ﬁsheries management.
The use of a ﬁxed discount rate in resource manage-
ment means that the rate of extraction is guided and
planned. The lower the discount rate, the more sustainable
the rate of extraction will be. However, when we try to
transpose this rationality onto human social and economic
behavior more broadly, it is found to be wanting. This is
because people are trying to make choices in a variety of
different arenas in their life in an ever-shifting context.
Therefore, ﬁrst, it is difﬁcult to measure a person’s
overall discount rate as this will vary according to the
area of their life in question; it may be related to livelihood
or marriage for example, not to mention the stage of their
life, as well as other contextual factors. Second and most
importantly, it is difﬁcult to assess how a person’s discount
rate will inﬂuence how they use the natural resources which
they are currently drawing on for their livelihood. Figure 1
summarizes potential sources of confusion in this
relationship.
Given the relationship between discounting and
resource extraction in cost–beneﬁt analyses, the pathways
above which link low discount rates with sustainable
ﬁshing and high discount rates to unsustainable ﬁshing
appear the most logical. However, there are several
reasons why this relationship may be altered. First, there
may be a lack of commitment to the ﬁshing industry and
investment interests outside which result in even those indi-
viduals whose behavior indicates low discount rates not
taking the future of the ﬁshery into consideration. Alterna-
tively ﬁshers with very high discount rates may actually
ﬁsh using legal ﬁshing methods because their employer
promotes those methods and therefore their individual dis-
count rates are mitigated. When considering incentives
within the context of co-management it is therefore impor-
tant that it is not taken for granted that the individuals who
are the least vulnerable, and theoretically more likely to be
incentivized to ﬁsh sustainably, will do so.
Synthesis – implications of risk context and
discounting behavior for co-management
This paper has sought to examine the proposition that
ﬁshers, and ﬁsherfolk more widely, have high discount
rates due to their high degree of risk exposure and vulner-
ability and that this may impact on whether or not they are
incentivized to ﬁsh sustainably. We have shown that not all
ﬁsherfolk have high discount rates. There is a noticeable
difference between the attitude of boat owners who are
apparently less likely to have high discount rates, than
the ﬁshing crew possibly due to the ﬁnancial and manage-
rial responsibility of boat ownership. The presence of other
Figure 1. Schematic diagram outlining key factors which may mitigate the inﬂuence of a ﬁsherman’s discount rate on sustainability.


























successful business people at both landing sites including
ﬁsh traders and shop owners is further evidence that not
all those residing in ﬁshing communities have short time
horizons. Additionally, women especially placed great
emphasis on educating their children, suggesting a willing-
ness to invest in the future. However, to the contrary, in
both Mhinga and Kitanba behavior which indicates high
rates of discounting have been described and observed
amongst men and women, especially boat crew and sex
workers. We believe that their high vulnerability causes
them to signiﬁcantly discount the future; thus actions that
result in short-term income generation are incentivized
over actions which protect resource sustainability.
But low discount rates do not necessarily incentivize
biologically sustainable ﬁshing practices. There are many
incentives for ﬁsherfolk to use illegal gear or trade in under-
sized ﬁsh even if they could, economically, ﬁsh legally. The
motivations that push people to the landing sites are not
usually a cultural or occupational commitment to ﬁshing
but are driven in most cases by economic necessity, and
if not necessity, then certainly economic opportunity. If
ﬁshing illegally or trading in illegal ﬁsh enables a boat
owner, ﬁsher or trader to maximize their income and
there are no other factors, such as pressure from other com-
munity members to ﬁsh legally, then this may be a logical
choice. If they are not committed to ﬁshing in the long term
they are strongly incentivized to use illegal ﬁshing methods
irrespective of their vulnerability or time horizon
Having established that one of the underlying assump-
tions of ﬁsheries co-management – that local communities,
acting as ‘rational’ economic decision-makers are intrinsi-
cally incentivized to ensure the sustainability of a resource
– may be untenable in certain contexts, the question
that remains is whether community management or co-
management can still address the ﬁsheries management
challenges it was designed to deal with. Instead of ignoring
the lack of incentives which local communities may have to
sustainably manage natural resources, community manage-
ment is actually well placed to incentivize sustainable
resource use, ﬁrst by working in partnership with commu-
nity development initiatives to reduce the risks and uncer-
tainties in ﬁsherfolk’s lives thus promoting longer time
horizons, and second by engaging a range of ﬁshery-sector
actors present at landing sites in a dialogue about the need
for resource management and the long-term investment pos-
sibilities in well-managed ﬁsheries. Although not straight
forward, enabling local ﬁshery management organizations
to broaden their role to include concern for the welfare of
ﬁsherfolk and other functions of local development organiz-
ations may help to address some of the current disincentives
of ﬁsherfolk’s participation in long-term stewardship that
requires short-term losses of income-generating opportu-
nities (Njock, Allison, and Konan 2008).
Whilst not the focus of this paper, we recognize that
there are differences in behavior between different classes
in the ﬁshing communities, most notably between the
boat owners and boat crew in Kitanba. The inﬁltration of
neoliberalism into ﬁshing communities has resulted in a
focus on wealth generation and the associated class div-
ision that accompanies it (Davis and Ruddle 2012),
which needs exploring so that paid workers, e.g. boat
crew, do not become even more marginalized and
exposed to risk. However, the risk and opportunities that
emerge from ﬁsheries within the global market place are
not simply due to co-management but much wider econ-
omic drivers. Therefore, although we have brought to
light more challenges which ﬁsheries co-management
faces, this does not suggest that a return to command-
and-control methods of management is the only solution.
As our awareness of the complexities of ﬁsherfolk’s incen-
tives and disincentives increases, so too does our capacity
to develop localized solutions which work to reduce vul-
nerability and build on the adaptability of community-
based organizations and individual resource users to
better align incentives, opportunities and sustainability.
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Notes
1. The LC is the locally elected political unit which represents
the lowest tier of the Ugandan Government’s decentralized
structure. Both of the case study communities had an operat-
ing LC, usually referred to as the ‘LC’. The role of the LC
Chairman varied between villages but usually he or she
played a key role in overcoming disputes in the community.
Where BMUs have been established they have taken over
some of the tasks of the LC where they are directly related
to the ﬁshers or ﬁsh traders.
2. The landing site names are pseudonyms.
3. Mukene is the local term for Silver Cyprinid (Rastrineobola
argentea). It is a small, low-value ﬁsh recently used in
chicken feed but with a long history of use for human con-
sumption, throughout central, eastern and southern Africa,
where it is usually traded in sun-dried form.
4. ‘Tycooning’ refers to the practice, used by ﬁshers, of hitting
the water with a large rock attached to a stick so that the ﬁsh
are disturbed and swim directly into their nets. It is thought to
increase catch size.
5. Based on an exchange rate of US$1 = UG 1690/- correct as
of 2 January 2008.
References
Abbott, J. G., L. M. Campbell, C. J. Hay, T. F. Næsje, and
J. Purvis. 2007. “Market-Resource Links and Fish Vendor
Livelihoods in the Upper Zambezi River Floodplains.”


























Human Ecology 35 (5): 559–574. doi:10.1007/s10745-006-
9102-5
Acheson, J. M. 1981. “Anthropology of Fishing.” Annual Review
of Anthropology 10: 275–316.
Acheson, J. M. 2006. “Institutional Failure in Resource
Management.” Annual Review of Anthropology 35: 117–
134. doi:10.1146/annurev.anthro.35.081705.123238
Agrawal, A., and C. C. Gibson. 1999. “Enchantment and
Disenchantment: The Role of Community in Natural
Resource Conservation.” World Development 27 (4): 629–
649. doi:10.1016/S0305-750X(98)00161-2
Allison, E. H. 2001. “Big Laws, Small Catches: Global Ocean
Governance and the Fisheries Crisis.” Journal of
International Development 13 (7): 933–950. doi:10.1002/
jid.834
Allison, E. H. 2005. “The Fisheries Sector, Livelihoods and
Poverty Reduction in Eastern and Southern Africa.” In
Rural Livelihoods and Poverty Reduction Policies, edited
by F. Ellis and H. A. Freeman, 256–273. London: Routledge.
Allison, E. H., and F. Ellis. 2001. “The Livelihoods Approach and
Management of Small-Scale Fisheries.”Marine Policy 25 (5):
377–388. doi:10.1016/S0308-597X(01)00023-9
Allison, E. H., A. Perry, M. Badjeck, N. Adger, K. Brown, D.
Conway, and A. Halls et al. 2009. “Vulnerability of
National Economies to the Impacts of Climate Change on
Fisheries.” Fish and Fisheries 10 (2): 173–196. doi:10.
1111/j.1467-2979.2008.00310.x
Allison, E. H., B. D. Ratner, B. Åsgård, R. Willmann, R. Pomeroy,
and J. Kurien. 2012. “Rights-Based Fisheries Governance:
From Fishing Rights to Human Rights.” Fish and Fisheries
13 (1): 14–29. doi:10.1111/j.1467-2979.2011.00405.x
Allison, E. H., and J. A. Seeley. 2004. “HIV and AIDS among
Fisherfolk: A Threat to ‘Responsible Fisheries’?” Fish and
Fisheries 5 (1): 215–234. doi:10.1111/j.1467-2679.2004.
00153.x
Bailey, C. 1988. “The Political Economy of Fisheries
Development in the Third World.” Agriculture and Human
Values 5 (1–2): 35–48. doi:10.1007/BF02217175
Barratt, C. 2012. “Netting the Beneﬁts Now or Later? Exploring
the Relationship Between Risk and Sustainability in Lake
Victoria Fisheries, Uganda.” In Risk and Africa Multi-disci-
plimary Empirical Approaches, edited by L. Bloemertz, M.
Doevenspeck, D. Müller-Mahn, and E. Macamo, 263–261.
Berlin: LIT Verlag Münster.
Béné, C. 2003. “When Fishery Rhymes with Poverty: A First Step
Beyond the Old Paradigm on Poverty in Small Scale
Fisheries.” World Development 31 (6): 949–975. doi:10.
1016/S0305-750X(03)00045-7
Béné, C. 2009. “Are Fishers Poor or Vulnerable? Assessing
Economic Vulnerability in Small-Scale Fishing
Communities.” Journal of Development Studies 45 (6):
911–933. doi:10.1080/00220380902807395
Béné, C., Macfadyen, G., and E. H. Allison. 2007. Increasing the
Contribution of Small-Scale Fisheries to Poverty Alleviation
and Food Security. Rome: FAO.
Ben-Yami, M. 2000. Risks and Dangers in Small-Scale Fisheries:
An Overview. Geneva: International Labour Ofﬁce.
Berkes, F. 1989. Common Property Resources: Ecology and
Community-Based Sustainable Development. London: Bell
Haven Press.
Berkes, F. 2004. “Rethinking Community-Based Conservation.”
Conservation Biology 18 (3): 621–630. doi:10.1111/j.1523-
1739.2004.00077
Bishai, D. M. 2001. “Lifecycle Changes in the Rate of Time
Preference: Testing the Theory of Endogenous Preferences
and Its Relevance to Adolescent Substance Use.” In
Economic Analysis of Substance Use and Abuse: The
Experience of Developed Countries and Lessons for
Developing Countries, edited by M. Grossman and C. R.
Hsieh, 155–177. London: Edward Elgar Press.
Bretteville-Jensen, A. L. 1999. “Addiction and Discounting.”
Journal of Health Economics 18 (4): 393–407. doi:10.1016/
S0167-6296(98)00057-5
Charles, A. T. 1994. “Towards Sustainability: The Fishery
Experience.” Ecological Economics 11 (3): 201–211.
doi:10.1016/0921-8009(94)90201-1
Cinner, J. E., T. R. McClanahan, M. A. MacNeil, N. A. J. Graham,
T. M. Daw, A. Mukminin, and D. A. Feary, et al. 2012.
“Comanagement of Coral Reef Social-Ecological Systems.”
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109 (14):
5219–5222. doi:10.1073/pnas.1121215109
Corbett, J. 1989. “Poverty and Sickness: The High Cost of Ill
Health.” IDS Bulletin 20 (2): 58–62. doi:10.1111/j.1759-
5436.1989.mp20002008.x
Davis, A., and K. Ruddle. 2012. “Massaging the Misery: Recent
Approaches to Fisheries Governance and the Betrayal of
Small-Scale Fisheries.” Human Organization 71 (3): 244–
254.
DFRU (Department of Fisheries Resources Uganda). 2006.
National Report of the FRAME Survey 2006 in the
Ugandan Part of Lake Victoria. Entebbe: Department of
Fisheries Resources Uganda.
DFRU (Department of Fisheries Resources Uganda). 2012.
“Department of Fisheries Resources Annual Report 2010/
2011.” http://www.agriculture.go.ug/userﬁles/DFR%20ANN
UAL%20REPORT%202012.pdf
Dorward, A., S. Anderson, Y. Nava, E. Bernal, J. Rushton, J.
Pattison, and R. Paz. 2009. “Hanging in, Stepping Up and
Stepping Out: Livelihood Aspirations and Strategies of the
Poor.” Development in Practice 19 (2): 240–247. doi:10.
1080/09614520802689535
Firth, R. W. 1966. Malay Fishermen: Their Peasant Economy.
London: Routledge.
Food and Agriculture Organisation. 2009. The State of World
Fisheries and Aquaculture 2008. Rome: FAO.
Gutiérrez, N. L., R. Hilborn, and O. Defeo. 2011. “Leadership,
Social Capital and Incentives Promote Successful
Fisheries.” Nature 470 (7334): 386–389. doi:10.1038/
nature09689
Hara, M., and J. Raakjær-Nielsen. 2003. “Experiences with
Fisheries Co-management in Africa.” In The Fisheries Co-
management Experience: Accomplishments, Challenges and
Prospects, edited by D. C. Wilson, J. R. Nielsen, and P.
Degnbol, 81–95. Dordrecht: Kulwer Academic Press.
Hardin, G. 1968. “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science 162
(3859): 1243–1248.
ILO (International Labour Organisation). 2004. “Danger at Sea –
Working in the Fisheries Sector.” http://www.ilo.org/global/
About_the_ILO/Media_and_public_information/Feature_
stories/lang–en/WCMS_075579/index.htm
Jennings, S., J. D. Reynolds, and S. C. Mills. 1998. “Life
History Correlates of Responses to Fisheries
Exploitation.” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London
B 265: 333–339.
Jentoft, S. 2003. “Introduction.” In The Fisheries Co-management
Experience, edited by D. C. Wilson, J. R. Nielsen, and P.
Degnbol, 1–14. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
Jentoft, S. 2007. “In the Power of Power: The Understated Aspect
of Fisheries and Coastal Management.” Human Organization
66 (4): 426–437.


























Jul-Larsen, E., J. Kolding, R. Overa, J. R. Nielsen, and P. van
Zwieten. 2003. Management, Co-management or No
Management? Major Dilemmas in Southern African
Freshwater Fisheries. Case studies. Rome: FAO.
Kasirye, I. 2011. “Addressing Gender Gaps in the Ugandan
Labour Market.” EPRC Policy Brief, April 2011. Issue No.
12. www.eprc.or.ug/pdf_ﬁles/policybrief12_gender.pdf
Kawarazuka, N., and C. Béné. 2011. “The Potential Role of Small
Fish Species in Improving Micronutrient Deﬁciencies in
Developing Countries: Building Evidence.” Public Health
Nutrition 14 (11): 1927–1938. doi:10.1017/S1368980011
000814
Kissling, E., E. H. Allison, J. A. Seeley, S. Russell, M. Bachmann,
S. D. Musgrave, and S. Heck. 2005. “Fisherfolk Are among
Groups Most at Risk of HIV: Cross-country Analysis of
Prevalence and Numbers Infected.” Aids 19 (17): 1939–1946.
Kolding, J., P. van Zwieten, O. Mkumbo, G. Solsbe, and R. Hecky.
2008. “Are the Lake Victoria Fisheries Threatened by
Exploitation or Eutrophication? Towards an Ecosystem-Based
Approach to Management.” In The Ecosystem Approach to
Fisheries, edited by G. Bianchi and H. R. Skjoldal, 309–350.
Rome: FAO.
Kolstad, I., and T. Søreide. 2009. “Corruption in Natural Resource
Management: Implications for Policy Makers.” Resources
Policy 34 (4): 214–226. doi:10.1016/j.resourpol.2009.05.001
LVFO (Lake Victoria Fisheries Organisation). 2009. The State of
Fish Stocks. Entebbe: LVFO.
Leach, M., R. Mearns, and I. Scoones. 1999. “Environmental
Entitlements: Dynamics and Institutions in Community-
Based Natural Resource Management.” World Development
27 (2): 225–247.
Mansﬁeld, B. 2007. “Property, Markets, and Dispossession: The
Western Alaska Community Development Quota as
Neoliberalism, Social Justice, Both, and Neither.” Antipode
39 (3): 479–499. doi:10.1002/9781444306750.ch4
Matheson, C., S. Morrison, E. Murphy, T. Lawrie, L. Ritchie, and
C. Bond. 2001. “The Health of Fishermen in the Catching
Sector of the Fishing Industry: A Gap Analysis.”
Occupational Medicine 51 (5): 305–311. doi:10.1093/
occmed/51.5.305
McGoodwin, J. R. 2001. Understanding the Cultures of Fishing
Communities: A Key to Fisheries Management and Food
Security. Rome: FAO.
Mill, J. S. 1848. The Principles of Political Economy. London:
Longmans, Green. http://www.efm.bris.ac.uk/het/mill/
book1/bk1ch11
Mills, D., C. Béné, S. Ovie, A. Taﬁda, F. Sinaba, A. Kodio, A.
Russell, N. Andrew, P. Morand, and J. Lemoalle. 2011.
“Vulnerability in African Small Scale Fishing
Communities.” Journal of International Development 23
(2): 308–313. doi:10.1002/jid.1638
Nielsen, J. R., P. Degnbol, K. K. Viswanathan, M. Ahmed, M.
Hara, and N. M. R. Abdullah. 2004. “Fisheries Co-manage-
ment – An Institutional Innovation? Lessons from South
East Asia and Southern Africa.” Marine Policy 28 (2): 151–
160. doi:10.1016/S0308-597X(03)00083-6
Njock, J., E. H. Allison, and A. Konan. 2008. “Institutional
Innovations in Fisheries Co-management.” In Achieving
Poverty Reduction Through Responsible Fisheries: Lessons
from West and Central Africa, edited by L. Westlund,
K. Holvoet, and M. Kébé, 67–81. Rome: Food & Agriculture
Organization.
Nunan, F. 2007. “Reducing Poverty Through Fisheries Co-man-
agement: An Analysis of Design and Intentions in Uganda.”
Journal of International Development 19 (8): 1151–1164.
doi:10.1002/jid.1391
Nunan, F. 2010. “Mobility and Fisherfolk Livelihoods on Lake
Victoria: Implications for Vulnerability and Risk.”
Geoforum 41 (5): 776–785.
Parker, M., T. Allen, G. Pearson, N. Peach, R. Flynn, and N. Rees.
2012. “Border Parasites: Schistosomiasis Control among
Uganda’s Fisherfolk.” Journal of Eastern African Studies 6
(1): 98–123. doi:10.1080/17531055.2012.664706
Peace, A. 1991. “Fishing, Drinking and the Construction of
Identity in Rural Ireland.” Maritime Anthropological Studies
4 (2): 3–16.
Poggie, J. J. 1978. “Deferred Gratiﬁcation as an Adaptive
Characteristic for Small-Scale Fishermen.” Ethos 6 (2):
114–123. doi:10.1525/eth.1978.6.2.02a00030
Pomeroy, R., and N. Andrew, eds. 2011. Small-Scale Fisheries
Management: Frameworks and Approaches for the
Developing World. Wallingford: CAB International.
Pratt, K. 2012. “Rethinking Community: Conservation,
Practice, and Emotion.” Emotion, Space and Society 5 (3):
177–185.
Pretty, J., and H. Ward. 2001. “Social Capital and the
Environment.” World Development 29 (2): 209–227. doi:10.
1016/S0305-750X(00)00098-X
Ribot, J. C. 1995. “From Exclusion to Participation:
Turning Senegal’s Forestry Policy Around?” World
Development 23 (9): 1587–1599. doi:10.1016/0305-750X
(95)00060-P
Sarch, M.-T., and E. H. Allison. 2000. “Fluctuating Fisheries in
Africa’s Inland Waters: Well-adapted Livelihoods,
Maladapted Management.” Proceedings of the 10th
International Conference of the Institute of Fisheries
Economics and Trade, Corvallis, OR, July 9–14.
Seabright, P. 1993. “Managing Local Commons: Theoretical
Issues in Incentive Design.” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 7 (4): 113–134.
Seeley, J., J. Nakiyingi-Miiro, A. Kamali, J. Mpendo, G. Asiki, A.
Abaasa, J. De Bont, L. Nielsen, and P. Kaleebu. 2012. “High
HIV Incidence and Socio-Behavioral Risk Patterns in Fishing
Communities on the Shores of Lake Victoria, Uganda.”
Sexually Transmitted Diseases 39 (6): 433–439. doi:10.
1097/OLQ.0b013e318251555d
Sen, S., and J. R. Nielsen. 1996. “Fisheries Co-management: A
Comparative Analysis.” Marine Policy 20 (5): 405–418.
doi:10.1016/0308-597X(96)00028-0
Welch-Devine, M. 2012. “Searching for Success: Deﬁning
Success in Co-management.” Human Organization 71 (4):
358–370.
Development Studies Research 27
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
sse
x]
 at
 08
:10
 21
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
15
 
